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Abstract 
Today’s economics and business students are expected to be our future’s business people and 
potentially our tomorrow’s economic leaders and politicians. Thus, their beliefs and practices are 
likely  to  affect  the  definition  of  acceptable  economics  and  business  ethics.  The  empirical 
evaluation of the cheating phenomenon in academia has been almost exclusively focused on the 
US  context,  and  the  non-US  studies  involve, in general, a narrow scope of countries. In the 
present  paper  we  perform  a  wide  cross-country  study  on  the  determinants  of  economics  and 
business undergraduate cheating which involves 21 countries from the American (4), European 
(14),  Africa  (2)  and  Oceania  (1)  continents  and  7213  students.  We  found  that  the  average 
magnitude of copying among the economics and business undergraduates is quite high (62%) but 
with a significant cross-country heterogeneity. The probability of cheating is significantly lower 
in students enrolled in schools located in the Nordic or the US plus British Isles blocks when 
compared with their South Europe counterparts; quite surprisingly that probability is also lower 
for the African block. Distinctly, students enrolled in schools from the Western and especially 
from  the  Eastern  Europe  observe  statistically  significant  higher  propensities  for  perpetrating 
academic fraud. Our findings further suggest that average cheating propensity in academia is 
significantly correlated with ‘real world’ business corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
Given  its  importance  for  a  country' s  economic  and  political  future,  the  education  sector  is 
expected to be particularly fair. In the book Stealing the Future: Corruption in the Classroom, the 
editors (Meier and Griffin, 2005) underline the fact that corruption in school leads to poor quality 
education; they further add plainly that “corruption in education is also incompatible with one of 
education' s major aims: producing citizens that respect the law and human rights”. 
In spite of the above well recognised and valued aims, in a recent article published by The New 
York Times (May 18, 2006), Jonathan D. Glater described the paramount magnitude of cheating 
among university students and the increasing worries by University Deans and the society in 
general about the escalating pervasiveness of the phenomenon within academia and its potential 
(detrimental) impact on business and ‘real world’ ethics. 
The critical issue here is that today’s economics and business students are likely to be tomorrow’s 
business  people  and,  as such, their beliefs and practices are likely to affect the definition of 
acceptable business ethics. Moreover, students’ perceptions of what constitutes ethical behaviour, 
whether accurate or not, will influence the actions they take once they enter the business world 
(Lawson, 2004).  
Students,  in  general,  and  those  in  Economics  and  Business  related  areas,  in  particular,  have 
grown  up  in  a  society  where  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong  are  blurred  and  where 
unethical behaviour by high-profile leaders is somewhat expected (Kidwell, 2001). Testifying on 
the rampant trend of cheating and plagiarism at a Thai first class reputation school, a professor 
sadly asserted “… the students who attend this school are likely to be the movers and shakers of 
the future in Thailand, the people who will be in positions of power. With the idea of impunity 
being re-enforced to them at such a young age, can we have any hope that corruption can be 
eliminated, or even reduced? These future leaders of the country are getting the message that it is 
ok to cheat.” (Stickman, 2004).  
Studies involving students’ beliefs regarding ethical behaviour in the business world tend to be 
daunting. Students have been found to make consistently less ethical choices than practitioners 
and  to  possess  lower  ethical  standards  than  businessmen  (Hollon  and  Ulrich,  1979;  Stevens, 
1984; Arlow and Ulrich, 1985; DeConick and Good, 1989; Glenn and Van Loo, 1993; Cole and   3
Smith,  1996;  Lord  and  Melvin,  1997).  Wood  et  al.  (1988)  concluded  that  students  were 
significantly more willing to engage in unethical behaviour than their professional counterparts. 
Magner (1989), reporting the results of a survey of business students at a conference dealing with 
business ethics, noted that 97% of the students agreed that “good ethics is good business” while 
71% believed that being ethical in business could hurt them in some instances. Similarly, Glenn 
(1988: 174) reported, a majority (54%) of the student respondents agreed with the statement that 
“a person in business is forced to do things that can conflict with her personal values”. 
As previously documented in Rocha and Teixeira (2005a, b), the empirical evaluation of the 
cheating phenomenon among university students have been almost exclusively focused on the US 
context, embracing usually few universities. The non-US related studies generally involved a 
narrow scope of countries.  
Thus, a comparative worldwide study on the cheating phenomenon would be illuminating on the 
cross  country  differences  in  university  students’  propensity  towards  illegal  behaviour  within 
academia. Moreover, it would permit, albeit in a rather preliminary and rude attempt, to assess 
whether average student cheating propensity is related to the existing standard measures of ‘real 
world’ business corruption (e.g, Corruption Perception Index, CPI). 
In the present paper we aim at extending our previous work on university cheating (Rocha and 
Teixeira,  2005b;  Teixeira  and  Rocha,  2006)  to  21  countries  (Argentina,  Austria,  Brazil, 
Colombia,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Mozambique,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA), which 
cover the whole ranking of the Corruption Perception Index 2005 (TI, 2006), from the second 
best positioned (New Zealand) up to one of the worst ranked country (Nigeria, 152
nd out of 
158
th). By correlating the average university cheating propensity with CPI score, which reflect 
the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, we 
uncover the potential direct relation between cheating in academia and cheating in ‘real world’ 
business. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section surveys existing studies on the topic of 
cheating and the potential relation to business ethics, and Section 3 reviews the determinants of 
university  cheating  and  puts  forward  the  main  hypotheses  of  the  study.  In  Section  4  the 
methodology for collecting the data is described and the following section (Section 5) presents   4
the  econometric  specification  used  for  evaluating  the  phenomenon  and  the  results.  The  last 
section concludes by discussing the main results of the study and uncovering the relation between 
academia cheating and ‘real world’ business corruption. 
2. Academic cheating and the business world ethics 
Research on academic cheating dates back to the turn of the century, with the earliest studies 
conducted within the fields of education and educational psychology (Hartshorne and May, 1928; 
Campbell, 1931). Since that time this body of research has been integrated with the research on 
societal deviance, with advanced understanding in both areas as a result of this alliance. The 
research on university cheating has not enjoyed as symbiotic a relationship with business ethics 
research  (Crown  and  Spiller,  1998).  Although  university  cheating  does  not  represent  an 
organizational  unethical  behaviour,  the  literature  pertaining  to  the  decision  to  engage  in  this 
behaviour may still contribute to our knowledge in business ethics. 
Newstrom  and  Ruch  (1976:  21)  admitted  that  “it  is  conceivable  that  a  student  who  has 
successfully cheated on an examination will be more likely to cheat on an expense account when 
he enters the world of business.” These authors proceeded questioning whether the student who 
falsifies a term project or commits some type of illegal behaviour at school would also falsify the 
records of campaign contributions by his/her company. 
Students generally hold the belief that people in the business world act in an unethical manner 
(Lawson, 2004). Yet, at the same time, a substantial proportion of the students admit to having 
engaged in academic dishonesty. Previous researchers have noted the apparent conflict between 
these two phenomena: “[o]n the one hand, collegians strongly disapprove of what they perceive 
as the businessman’s lack of integrity. On the other hand, many college students occasionally 
cheat on examinations. One wonders how collegians explain this apparent inconsistency. Are 
their temptations more severe than the businessman’s? Do they regard it as less reprehensible to 
be unethical in academic matters than in economic? If so, why?” (Baumhart, 1961: 19). 
Especially troubling is that some educators believe that students may no longer view cheating as 
morally wrong (Pavela and McCabe, 1993). As early as 1987 Stevens and Stevens reported a 
heightened concern about cheating in higher education. After the American Council on Higher 
Education reported in 1990 that cheating at colleges is on the rise, studies began to explore the 
issue of cheating (Bunn et al., 1992; Kerkvliet, 1994). Consistent with the work of Bunn et al.   5
(1992) and Kerkvliet (1994) the presumption is made that cheating behaviour is related to the 
perceived costs and benefits of cheating. Quite possibly the decision to cheat can also vary by 
certain  demographic  characteristics,  a  group  of  individual  characteristics,  as  well  as  the 
educational environment. 
More recent studies on cheating (e.g. Bunn et al. 1992; Kekvliet and Sigmund, 1999) are based 
on econometric specifications consistent with the assumption of a relation between fraudulent 
behaviour and the notion of costs and benefits resulting from it. So these studies are adaptations 
of Becker’s (1968) crime model to academic dishonesty.
1 
Most of studies that examine the importance, in quantitative terms, of cheating in academia (cf. 
Table  1)  show  that  the  dimension  of  cheating  is  considerable  –  over  one  third.  One  of  the 
pioneering studies by Bunn et al. (1992) concerning an analysis of two higher education courses 
in Microeconomics in Alabama (US), the authors found that half the students surveyed admitted 
to having copied. They also found that cheating was ‘normal’ among students, with 80% of them 
saying  that  they  had  seen  a  colleague  copying  and  half  of  them  said  that  they  had  seen  a 
colleague  being  caught  copying.  Apart  from  the  magnitude  of  the  phenomenon,  unlawful 
behaviour seems to be quite well ‘interiorised’ in the student community, with 28% of students 
admitting to knowing colleagues who copy regularly. The vast incidence of the phenomenon 
seems to be justified by the fact that most students (70%) do not see copying as a serious offence 
(Bunn et al., 1992). 
In a survey of university first year students, Collinson (1990) found that 37% admitted to having 
cheated on a test in high school. Nazario (1990) cites a poll that found that 47% of the students 
surveyed  would  cheat  on  an  exam.  78%  of  students  surveyed  at  the  University  of  Delaware 
acknowledged  having  cheated  (Collinson,  1990).  In  addition  to  this  evidence  of  widespread 
academic dishonesty, there is evidence that the problem may be increasing over time (Davis et 
al., 1992; McCabe, 2005). 
In  another  context  (two  public  universities  in  the  US),  and  looking  at  more  courses  (six 
Economics classes), Kerkvliet (1994) found that in the random response questionnaire 42% of 
students indicated they had copied at least once in an exam. In a later study, covering 12 classes 
                                                 
1 Rocha and Teixeira (2005a) account for the distinct forms of theorizing illegal behaviours and adapt Becker’s crime 
model (1968) to cheating.   6
in the two universities, Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) estimated that an average of 12.8% of the 
students  surveyed  had  copied  at  least  once.  But  there  was  considerable  disparity  among  the 
groups ranging from 0.2% in the least ‘deceitful’ class and 32% in the one where cheating was 
most common. The authors say this disparity is due to the different measures of "intimidation" 
used  in  the  various  classes  (number  of  tests  per  student  that  watch  out  for  discipline  in  the 
universities; space per student in the classroom; number of test versions used by the teacher; kind 
of exam).  
Taking a larger population than that in the Bunn et al.’s (1992) study Nowell and Laufer (1997) 
looked at two higher courses in the USA (Economics and Accounting) and concluded that the 
average propensity for dishonesty was around 27%.  
More recently, and with reference to other scientific areas, findings by Sheard and Dick (2003) in 
a  study  on  postgraduate  students  in  Information  Technology  at  a  university  in  Melbourne 
(Australia) showed that 9% of students admitted to being involved in serious forms of cheating in 
exams. In other study on unlawful behaviour among students from the 2
nd to the 6
th year of 
Medicine  in  a  Croatian  university,  Hrabak  et  al.  (2004)  found  that  94%  admitted  to  having 
committed  some  kind  of  deceit  at  least  once  during  their  studies.  When  it  came  to  copying 
answers  or using ‘cheat sheets’ the percentages were 52.2% and 34.6%, respectively. Also a 
considerable  percentage  (66.4%)  of  Psychology  and  Management  students  in  three  Dutch 
universities admitted to have cheated (Bernardi et al., 2004). 
In the new research from the Center for Academic Integrity (CAI) conducted by Don McCabe 
(released in June, 2005), involving almost 50,000 undergraduates (on more than 60 campuses) 
who have participated in a nationwide (USA) survey of academic integrity since the fall of 2002, 
70%  of  students  admit  to  some  cheating.  Close  to  one-quarter  of  the  participating  students 
admitted to serious test cheating in the past year and half admitted to one or more instances of 
serious cheating on written assignments. Longitudinal comparisons show significant increases in 
serious test/examination cheating and not allowed student collaboration. For example, the number 
of students self-reporting instances of not allowed collaboration at nine medium to large US state 
universities increased from 11% in a 1963 survey to 49% in 1993 (McCabe, 2005). 
Focusing on European countries, Teixeira and Rocha (2006), and Rocha and Teixeira (2005b), 
estimated that the magnitude of cheating among undergraduate Economics and Business students 
was preoccupying reaching values between 62% (Portugal) and 94.0% (Romania).   7
Table 1: Magnitude of academic dishonesty among students 






Bunn et al. (1992)  University - 
Undergraduate  Microeconometrics (2)  USA (1) (Alabama)  476  50.0% 
Kerkvliet (1994)  University - 
Undergraduate  Economics (6)  USA (2)  363  42.2% 





Accounting (2)  USA (2)  311  27.0% 
McCabe and Trevino 
(1997) 
University -
Undergraduate  -  USA (9)  1793  30.0% 

















Behavioural and Social 
Sciences. Criminal 
Justice. Economics and 
Physical Education (18) 




Undergraduate  Economics (12)  USA (2)  597  12.8% 
Tibbetts (1999)  University -
Undergraduate 
Introductory 
Behavioural Science (6) 
USA (1) (Mid-
Atlantic)  598  39.0% 
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(Melbourne)  112  9.0%-38.0% 
Bernardi et al. (2004)  University -
Postgraduate 
Psychology and 
Management (2)  Netherlands (3)  220  66.4% 
Hrabak et al. (2004)  University -
Undergraduate  Medical Sciences   Croatia (1) (Zagreb)  827  34.6%-52.2% 
Rettinger et al. 
(2004) 
University -
Undergraduate  Arts (4)  USA (1) 
(Northeastern)  103  53.0%-83.0% 
McCabe (2005)  Undergraduate  Several  USA (60 campuses)  50 000  70.0% 
Rocha and Teixeira 
(2005b)  Undergraduate  Economics and 
Business  Portugal (10)  2675  62.0% 
Teixeira and Rocha 
(2006)  Undergraduate  Economics and 
Business 
Austria (1), Portugal 
(6), Romania (1) and 
Spain (1) 
2817  62.3%-94.0% 
Source: Part of the table is based in Table 1 from Rocha and Teixeira (2005b: 5) 
Callahan (2004), author of The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get 
Ahead, suggested that students today feel more pressure to do well in order to get into graduate or 
professional  school  and  secure  a  job.  Indeed,  in  a  time  of  economic  rationalism  and  high 
unemployment levels, the competition to gain qualifications is increasing. Passing exams, doing 
well in assignments, and ensuring a high ranking score in relation to fellow students - jostling for 
position against competitors - is seen as a key step towards success or failure in getting well paid 
employment in the future. Building on the widely held idea that the free market and competition 
are desirable attributes, such student competition would appear to be a good thing. According to 
Godfrey  and  Waugh  (1997)  this  increased  competition  among  students appears to have been 
responsible for a trend towards a rise in academic cheating in educational institutions.   8
3. Determinants of academic cheating and the main hypotheses of the study 
In order to better understand the phenomenon of cheating, several authors (e.g., Whitley, 1998) 
identified  a  host  of  factors  associated  with  university  student  cheating.  Consistent  with  the 
organizational literature (Crown and Spiller, 1998), the role individual factors play in affecting 
the decision to cheat has received the bulk of empirical attention.  
Table 2: Factors influencing the propensity to cheat, by groups of determinants 
Groups of determinants  Determinants  Studies 
Students characteristics 
￿￿ Gender 
￿￿ Average course grade 
￿￿ Consumption of alcohol 
￿￿ Academic year of studies 
￿￿ Religious preference  
￿￿ Student Status 
￿￿ Have failed at least a year 
￿￿ Moral factors and kind of personality 
￿￿ Motivation and competence 
Fakouri (1972); Michaels and Miethe (1978); 
Baird (1980); Leming (1980); Haines et al. 
(1986); Graham et al. (1994); Kerkvliet 
(1994); Nowell and Laufer (1997), Whitey 
(1998); Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999); 
Tibbetts (1999); Bernardi et al. (2004); 
Hrabak et al. (2004); Rettinger et al. (2004); 
Rocha and Teixeira (2005b); Teixeira and 
Rocha (2006) 
Factors related with the education institution  
￿￿ Dimension and level of class 
￿￿ Category of teachers  
￿￿ Existence of an “honour code” 
￿￿ Classroom environment 
Gardner et al. (1988); May and Loyd (1993); 
Nowell and Laufer (1997), Whitey (1998); 
Pulvers and Diekhoff (1999); Kerkvliet and 
Sigmund (1999); McCabe et al. (2003); Rocha 
and Teixeira (2005b); Teixeira and Rocha 
(2006) 
Cost of detecting academic dishonesty 
￿￿ Teachers’ academic category 
￿￿ Existence of verbal warnings regarding the 
resultant consequences of copying in 
exams 
Houston (1983); Bunn et al. (1992) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Probability of detecting copying 
￿￿ Number of tests by students with the goal 
of maintaining good behaviour 
￿￿ Geographic class occupation by student 
￿￿ Number of exams versions utilized by 
instructor  
￿￿ Type of exams 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Benefits of copying (in the case of not being 
caught) 
￿￿ Expected classification  
￿￿ Number of “free” hours for the student 
during the term 
￿￿ Type of Courses 
Whitey (1998); Kerkvliet and Sigmund 
(1999); Rocha and Teixeira (2005b); Teixeira 
and Rocha (forthcoming) 
Benefits of not copying  ￿￿ Average number of weekly hours of study  Kerkvliet (1994) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Others factors 
￿￿ Students’ opinion of those that copy or 
commit other types of academic 
dishonesty  
￿￿ Students perception in light of the 
percentage of students that copy and of 
rival group behaviours 
￿￿ Intensity of Work (“Workload”) 
￿￿ Pressure not to fail 
￿￿ Type of courses  
￿￿ Country /region 
￿￿ Students’ background 
￿￿ Students’ origin 
Millham (1974); Houston and Ziff (1976); 
Baird (1980); Lanza-Kaduce and Klug (1986); 
Bunn et al. (1992); May and Loyd (1993); 
Ward and Tittle (1993); Kerkvliet (1994); 
McCabe and Trevino (1997); Nowell and 
Laufer (1997); Whitey (1998); Diekhoff et al. 
(1999); Magnus et al. (2002); Sheard and Dick 
(2003); Hrabak et al. (2004); Rocha and 
Teixeira (2005b); Teixeira and Rocha (2006) 
Source: Part of the table is based in Table 2 from Rocha and Teixeira (2005b: 5) 
Separate studies systematically indicate a series of determinants for academic dishonesty which 
may  be  grouped  into  seven  major  factors  (cf.  Table  2)  –  e.g.,  student  characteristics,  factors 
related to the institution, variables influencing the likelihood of the phenomenon being detected   9
and  the  respective  cost  of  detection,  and also causes associated with the benefits of copying 
(when they are not caught) and the benefits of not copying.  
Grade Point Average (G.P.A.) and Expected Benefits. Bushway and Nash (1977: 624) reported 
that “the majority of studies indicate that students who are lower in school achievement may 
cheat more frequently.” Research continues to find a significant negative relationship between 
cheating and G.P.A. (see Crown and Spiller (1998) for a survey). Although Bunn et al.’s (1992) 
results confirm this assumption, many authors (Kerkvliet, 1994; Nowell and Laufer, 1997; and 
Kerkvliet  and  Sigmund,  1999)  did  not  find  the  course  average  statistically  significant. 
Notwithstanding,  Hrabak  et  al.  (2004)  argue  that  the  course  average  could  be  relevant  in 
explaining attitudes to cheating. They take the view that students with a higher average have a 
more  negative  attitude  to  copying  than  those  with  a  lower  one,  and  further  disapprove  of 
swapping questions by phone during an exam, and using personal relations to pass an exam. 
Concerning grades, we suggested here, linked to the cost/benefit idea (similarly to Rocha and 
Teixeira,  2005b),  that  perhaps  more  important  than  students’  average  grade/mark,  a  critical 
determinant  of  the  propensity  to  cheat  is  students’  perceived  ‘benefits’,  in  terms of a higher 
grade, which they expect if they copy successfully. 
In this line, we aim at testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of copying is increased when the difference between the mark/grade 
students expect if they copy is positive when compared with the mark/grade that 
they expect if they do not copy.  
Hypothesis 2: The probability of copying is higher the greater the difference between the mark 
students says they expect if they do in fact copy and the mark if no copying takes 
place. 
Contextual  factors.  The  role  situational  factors  play  in  affecting  the  decision  to  cheat  has 
garnered a significant amount of recent attention. Consistent with Ford and Richardson (1994: 
212),  situational/contextual  factors  encompass  the  “pressures  which  come  to  bear  on  the 
individual  to  encourage  or  discourage  ethical  decision  making.  Contextual  factors  and  the 
environment-pear pressure and attitudes towards academic dishonesty are considered by a larger 
number of studies (e.g., Houston, 1986; Lanza-Kaduce and Klug, 1986; Ward and Title, 1993) as 
conditioning factors for the development of unlawful academic practices. In fact, Bunn et al.   10
(1992) found that the likelihood of copying is directly related to observing others doing so, and 
the perception of the number of students who routinely copy. In other words, the probability of a 
student having already copied is conditioned by his/her beliefs in relation to other students who 
copy. Furthermore, these authors assess the perception students have regarding the severity of the 
punishment  applied  if  they  are  caught  copying  and  use  this  and  indicators  of  the  climate  of 
cheating perceived by students to evaluate their perception of the percentage who copy. They find 
evidence for the belief among students that, given the negligible effect of intimidation attached to 
expected punishments, they are very unlikely to be caught copying. In addition they find that 
students do not think copying is a serious crime, which could contribute to a greater incidence of 
this phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 3: In copying-favourable environments where permissibility and permeability towards 
copying is high, students’ propensity for copying tends to be higher. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher and more serious the perceived sanctions are, fewer incentives students 
have to perpetrating dishonest behaviours. 
Honour codes. Since the earlier of the twentieth century researchers have been interested in the 
effectiveness of honour codes. For instance, Campbell (1935) reported that in instances where 
honour guarantees were used students were less likely to cheat than students placed in traditional 
proctor conditions. This finding has been replicated as recently as 1993. In an extensive survey of 
6090 students McCabe and Trevino (1993) found that students under honour systems reported 
significantly  lower  levels  of  cheating  than  students  without  honour  codes.  Interestingly,  the 
acceptance of the policy, the likelihood of being reported, and the severity of the penalty for 
being caught all influenced the likelihood students would refrain from cheating. Perhaps most 
interesting is their finding that the perceived behaviour of peers was the most important factor in 
predicting  cheating  behaviours.  May  and  Loyd  (1993)  also  found  a  significant  reduction  in 
cheating for students at universities with honour codes. Although McCabe et al. (2003) do not 
analyse directly the influence of codes of honour on the probability of copying, they examine 
whether this variable has an effect on the academic integrity of university staff in terms of their 
attitudes and behaviours. The analysis is based on universities with and without codes of honour. 
The authors found that universities which have a code of honour have more positive attitudes 
towards policies of academic integrity and are more willing to allow the system to take measures   11
to warn and discipline students. Furthermore, they confirmed that, in the absence of a code of 
honour, university faculty members with this experience believe in students being responsible for 
monitoring their colleagues, recognising the fairness and efficiency of their institutions’ policies 
of academic integrity. Following this line of argument we hypothesise here that:  
Hypothesis 5: In universities where ‘codes of honour’ exist, the propensity for copying among 
students is lower. 
Countries/social  and  cultural  factors.  Differences  in  social  factors  are  likely  to  comprise  an 
important factor in explaining students’ propensity to cheat. For instance, Diekhoff et al. (1999) 
detect  differences  and  similarities  in  American  and  Japanese  students  copying  in  exams. 
Weighting the limitation associated with the distinct composition of the two samples (both in 
terms of size and associated with various demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and 
school year), the data show that in comparison with the Americans, the Japanese students are 
more prone to copy in exams. With regard to with social involvement, Diekhoff et al. (1999) 
consider that if copying is viewed as widespread, it is harder for Japanese students to resist to the 
pressure of copying or to help their colleagues to copy, given the group and team orientation 
among  Japanese  students.  In  a  complementary  way,  Magnus  et  al.  (2002)  conducted  an 
experiment on students in secondary, higher and postgraduate education, in 5 different regions - 
Moscow, Russia (province), the Netherlands, the USA and Israel - and show that both the level of 
teaching and the zone lead to students having distinct opinions relative to academic dishonesty. 
More  recently,  Teixeira  and  Rocha  (2006)  show  that  differences  in  undergraduate  copying 
propensities  are  surmount,  with  Romania  and  Spanish  students  revealing  a  higher  propensity 
towards fraudulent behaviours than their Austrian and specially their Portuguese counterparts. 
Thus we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 6: The propensity to copy is influenced by the countries’ cultural/educational systems 
and social and business ethics-related factors. 
Gender. Crown and Spiller (1998) in a review of studies on cheating argued that the relationship 
between gender and cheating appears to have become more tenuous in the recent past. In the 
earlier studies such as the one by Bushway and Nash (1977), it was concluded that the amount of 
cheating behaviours engaged in by females was fewer than the amount engaged in by males. 
With  the  exception  of  Karabenick  and  Srull  (1978)  and  Graham  et  al.  (1994),  the  studies   12
published after 1982 did not find significant gender differences. Surprisingly, the latest study to 
find gender differences reported that females were more likely to admit to cheating than males 
(Graham et al., 1994). An explanation of the attenuation of gender differences may be found in 
Ward and Beck’s (1990) work. They noted that sex-role socialization is thought to influence the 
tendency towards dishonesty through differences in internalised role requirements. The prevailing 
non-significant relationship between gender and cheating during the latter ears might suggest a 
convergence in role requirements among males and females in collegiate settings. In Rocha and 
Teixeira’s (2005b) study females were found to significantly cheat less than males. Additional 
studies (Kerkvliet, 1994; Nowell and Laufer, 1997; Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999; Tibbets, 1999; 
Hrabak et al., 2004) focused this relation but without any clear-cut picture. 
Age. Several studies (e.g., Barnes, 1975; Baird, 1980; Michaels and Miethe, 1978; Haines et al., 
1986;  Graham  et  al.,  1994)  reported  significant  age-cheating  relationships,  while  Antion  and 
Michael (1983), and Daniel et al. (1991) did not find a significant correlation. Unfortunately, the 
importance of age effects are difficult to detect in the cheating literature. In most studies age is 
restricted to a five-year span in addition to being highly correlated with class. In the one study 
that focused on traditional versus non-traditional age students Graham et al. (1994) found that the 
former cheated more than the latter. Studies assessing differences within the traditional age span 
have produced mixed findings. Barnes (1975) and Michaels and Miethe (1978) found that older 
students were more likely to cheat, while Baird (1980) and Haines et al. (1986) reported that 
younger  students  cheated  more  frequently.  Similarly  to  this  later  study,  Rocha  and  Teixeira 
(2005b) found that younger undergraduates are more likely to commit illegal conducts. 
Year  of  study.  The  year  in  school  have  been  reliably  associated  with  cheating  attitudes  and 
behaviour,  with  attitudes  toward  cheating  becoming  more  negative  and  cheating  behaviour 
declining with increases in year in school (Davis et al., 1992; Diekhoff et al., 1996; Haines et al., 
1986).  Diekhoff  et  al.  (1999)  however,  found that their more mature/senior Japanese sample 
actually engaged in more cheating than did students in their American sample. In the same line, 
Nowell and Laufer (1997) found that seniors, who, according to the authors, would have little to 
gain in terms of overall change in GPA, were somewhat less likely to cheat than freshmen (first 
year students).   13
Student status. Previous research highlights the importance of the students’ workload. Nowell 
and  Laufer (1997) found that increased workload was positively related to the probability of 
cheating. Students who were employed either part time or full time were more likely to cheat than 
students  who  were  not  employed.  Thus  cheating  propensity  is  likely  to  be  dependent  on  the 
student status, that is whether it is a regular/full time student of part-time student combining 
employment  (Working  Students,  WSs)  or  other  student-related  tasks  (Association  Members, 
AMs).  
4. Methodological issues and data exploratory description 
Cheating  is  a  complex  issue.  When  exploring  students’  cheating  behaviour  in  university 
institutions there are many aspects to consider. It is not surprising, therefore, that a search of the 
literature has shown a lack of any simple definitions (Sheard et al., 2003). Typically, cheating is 
described in terms of a series of practices, which cover a range of areas that can be defined as 
illegal, unethical, immoral or against the regulations of the course or institution. The difficulty of 
clearly  defining  cheating  is  exacerbated  by  differences  across  institutions  and  also  across 
disciplines of study (Maramark and Maline, 1993). Some practices, however, may be universally 
accepted as cheating, for example, employing someone to sit an examination or copying at exams 
(by  a  colleague  and/or  using  not  allowed  written/taped/saved  notes  in  papers,  cell  phones, 
calculators, etc.). In this study we defined a cheating behaviour copying at exams. 
Measuring cheating in academia is not an easy task and researchers have generally used their own 
information to gather data for assessing this type of behaviour (Nowell and Laufer, 1997). The 
literature  points  to  four  main  ways  to  obtain  data  on  academic  fraudulence  (Kerkvliet  and 
Sigmund, 1999): direct yet discrete observation of the data; the “overlapping error” method; the 
random answer questions method, and inquiry via the direct questions method. In the present 
work we have opted for the latter method. Although this method takes no account of problems 
associated with sensitivity to the kind of questions asked (like the random answers method), 
meaning  that  it  can  induce  deviation  in  the  estimates  of  academic  dishonesty  (Kerkvliet and 
Sigmund, 1999), it does have simplicity of implementation in its favour, and a wealth of output 
for analysis. This is why it is often the procedure used (Bunn et al., 1992; Magnus et al., 2002; 
Sheard and Dick, 2003; Hrabak et al., 2004).
2 
                                                 
2 Rocha and Teixeira (2005a) provide a detailed description of the different methods.   14
We devised a one page inquiry in line with Bunn et al. (1992) embracing a range of questions 
focusing  the  main  determinants  associated  with  academic  fraudulent  behaviour,  adding  new 
variables/questions which in our view are likely to influence the propensity to copy (cf. Section 
2).  
The target group was 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th year students from Economics and Business/Management 
courses.  The  questionnaire  was  implemented  in  11  Portuguese  Universities  (all  public 
universities from the mainland plus University of Azores), and 31 schools/universities of 20 other 
countries. In operational terms, for the majority of schools, the questionnaires were implemented 
in the classrooms (in general it were targeted the classes with the highest number of enrolled 
students).  
For schools in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, France, and Poland, students filled an on-line 
questionnaire similar to the one the other students filled in classes. The on-line option was chosen 
following the suggestions of professors/researchers from the targeted schools given the difficulty 
that, within a reasonable time span, to assembly in classes a sufficient number of students. The 
survey was conducted between March 2005 and May 2006 resulting 7213 valid responses. 
Reflecting the number of schools surveyed, the number of responses from Portuguese students 
totalled almost 40% of total responses. The remaining responses were distributed, by decreasing 
order of responses, as follows: Spain with 22% of the remaining total; Turkey and Austria with 
about 12%; Slovenia, New Zealand and Germany with approximately 7%; Italy, Nigeria and UK 
with  between  5%-6%;  with  around  2%  we  have  Mozambique,  Brazil,  Romania,  Ireland, 
Denmark,  and  Argentina;  finally,  the  least  representative  countries  with  about  1%  of  the 
remaining total, France, Colombia, Sweden, US, and Poland.   15
Table 3: Countries, schools and number of students that participated in the survey  
Country  Number of 
schools/universities  Number of responses  % Total responses  % Total responses 
(excl. Portugal) 
Argentina  1  75  1,0  1,7 
Austria  1  519  7,2  11,8 
Brazil  1  100  1,4  2,3 
Colombia  1  44  0,6  1,0 
Denmark  1  78  1,1  1,8 
France  2  62  0,9  1,4 
Germany  3  305  4,2  6,9 
Ireland  1  79  1,1  1,8 
Italy  2  279  3,9  6,3 
Mozambique  1  115  1,6  2,6 
New Zealand  1  315  4,4  7,1 
Nigeria  1  237  3,3  5,4 
Poland  1  20  0,3  0,5 
Portugal  11  2805  38,9   
Romania  2  99  1,4  2,2 
Slovenia  2  321  4,5  7,3 
Spain  3  955  13,2  21,7 
Sweden  1  44  0,6  1,0 
Turkey  2  528  7,3  12,0 
UK  2  197  2,7  4,5 
US  2  36  0,5  0,8 
Total  42  7213  100,0  100,0 
Given the low representativeness of the responses for some countries and the pertinence of the 
analysis we thought it was advisable to additionally aggregate countries into 8 meaningful blocks, 
as represented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the responses by blocks of countries 
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Our  worldwide  survey  on  copying  propensity  among  economics  and  business  undergraduate 
students  points  to  an  average  cheating  propensity  of  61.7%.  Thus,  similarly  to  the  studies 
surveyed in Section 2, we conclude that the phenomenon of cheating in the Universities reaches a 
relatively  high  magnitude.  Recall  that  studies  using  a  comparable  methodology  to  the  one 
presented here estimated copying probabilities between 50% (Bunn et al., 1992) and 62% (Rocha 
and Teixeira, 2005b). Focusing also on copying practices Hrabak et al. (2004) pointed to figures 
between 34.6% and 52.2%.  
Figure 2: Probability of ‘copying’ by (blocks of) countries 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
The interesting contribution of our study relies on the evidence of striking differences in cheating 
behaviours between (blocks of) countries. In fact, from the Figure 2, it is apparent, for instance, 
the vast differences between the Nordic countries, whose average propensity to cheat is below 
5%,  and  the  Eastern  Europe  countries  with  an  average  cheating  propensity  of  87.9%.  Latin 
America and South Europe blocks present rather similar averages, respectively 67.9% and 66.4%. 
In  the  US  plus  British  Isles  (Ireland  and  the  UK)  block  around  17%  of  students  surveyed 
admitted to have cheated, which is not far from the percentage of their New Zealand (Oceania) 














































































































(Mozambique  plus  Nigeria),  where  around  ‘only’  half  of  the  students  admitted  to  commit 
fraudulent behaviours. 
Table 4: Frequency of copying by countries and countries’ blocks 
% total of students in each country/block 
Countries/Blocks 
Never  Sometimes  Often 
Probability of 
copying (%) 
% total responses 
(n=7139) 
British Isles (Irl+UK)  85,6  14,0  0,4  14.4 
United States  61,1  36,1  2,8  38.9 
US_BI  82.7  16.6  0.7  17.3 
4.3 
Argentina  55,4  43,2  1,4  44,6 
Brazil  17,0  72,0  11,0  83,0 
Colombia  27,3  70,5  2,3  72,7 
Latin America  32.1  61.9  6.0  67.9 
3.1 
Denmark  94,9  3,8  1,3  5,1 
Sweden  95,5  4,5  0,0  4,5 
Nordic Countries  95.1  4.1  0.8  4.9 
1.7 
Austria  28,4  67,5  4,2  71,6 
France  16,1  80,6  3,2  83,9 
Germany  49,3  49,3  1,3  50,7 
Western Europe  34.7  62.2  3.1  65.3 
12.1 
Italy  36,6  60,1  3,3  63,4 
Spain  20,4  73,0  6,6  79,6 
Turkey  34,6  60,4  5,0  65,4 
Portugal  37.6  60.0  2.4  62.4 
South Europe  33.6  62.7  3.7  66.4 
63.6 
Poland  0,0  85,0  15,0  100,0 
Romania  4,0  81,8  14,1  96,0 
Slovenia  15,4  78,3  6,3  84,6 
Eastern Europe  12.1  79.4  8.5  87.9 
6.1 
Mozambique  33,7  65,3  1,0  66,3 
Nigeria  57,4  39,1  3,5  42,6 
Africa  49.3  48.1  2.6  50.7 
4.8 
New Zealand  79.3  20.1  0.6  20.7  4.3 
All Countries  38.3  58.1  3.6  61.7  100 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
Distinguishing the frequency that students in each country and block of countries commit illegal 
behaviours  during  exams  provides  interesting  patterns.  Countries  from  Eastern  Europe,  in 
particular  Poland  and  Romania,  and  Latin  America,  namely  Brazil,  present  the  highest 
percentages of students that admit copying in exams often or always. In shear contrast we have 
Oceania (New Zealand), US and the British Isles and Nordic countries were a meagre percentage 
of student (below 0.8%) admit copying. Specifically Sweden, where no student admits copying 
with high frequency, and Ireland plus the UK emerge as the least prone to very regular behaviour 
towards cheating. Western and South Europe blocks present very similar figures (3.1% and 3.7%,   18
respectively), evidencing from these blocks (by a negative perspective) Austria (4.2%) and Spain 
(6.6%). Notable are the figures from the African block, in particular Mozambique with only 1% 
of the corresponding total respondent students admitting copying with regularity. 
Analysing  the  percentages  of  students  that  claimed  never  ever  have  copied,  once  again  the 
Nordic,  the  US  plus  British  Isles,  and  the  New  Zealand,  emerge  here  as  the  ‘cleaner’ 
undergraduate academics. In these (blocks of) countries 80% and over of their students stated that 
never  committed  fraud  in  exams.  By  contrast,  Eastern  countries  (especially  Poland),  France, 
Brazil and Spain come up with the lowest percentages in this regard with 0% (Poland) up to 20% 
(Spain) of the corresponding total students claiming never have copied. 
Table 5: Frequency of ‘observing others copying’ by countries and blocks of countries 
% total of students in each country/block 
Countries/Blocks 
Never  Sometimes  Often 
Prob. of observing 
copying (%) 
% total responses 
(n=7171) 
British Isles (Irl+UK)  47,5  46,7  5,8  52,5 
United States  13,9  75,0  11,1  86,1 
US_BI  43.6  50.0  6.4  56.4 
4.4 
Argentina  4,0  70,7  25,3  96,0 
Brazil  0,0  35,0  65,0  100,0 
Colombia  0,0  65,9  34,1  100,0 
Latin America  1.4  53.3  45.3  98.6 
3.1 
Denmark  79,5  17,9  2,6  20,5 
Sweden  81,8  18,2  0,0  18,2 
Nordic Countries  80.3  18.1  1.6  19.7 
1.7 
Austria  11,0  68,6  20,4  89,0 
France  4,8  51,6  43,5  95,2 
Germany  18,5  71,3  10,2  81,5 
Western Europe  13.1  68.3  18.6  86.9 
12.2 
Italy  12,0  52,6  35,4  88,0 
Spain  2.6  47.3  50.1  97.4 
Turkey  7,6  54,4  38,0  92,4 
Portugal  7,5  68,6  23,9  92,5 
South Europe  6.8  61.5  31.7  93.2 
63.4 
Poland  0,0  70,0  30,0  100,0 
Romania  1,0  38,4  60,6  99,0 
Slovenia  6,3  63,7  30,0  93,7 
Eastern Europe  4.8  58.2  37.0  95.2 
6.1 
Mozambique  7,0  61,0  32,0  93,0 
Nigeria  16,2  54,9  28,9  83,8 
Africa  13.5  56.7  29.8  86.5 
4.8 
New Zealand  52.3  45.1  2.6  47.7  4.3 
All Countries  12.4  59.7  27.9  87.6  100 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006.   19
Observing  other  students  copying  (Table  4)  might  constitute  an  indirect measure of cheating 
propensity and a reasonable indicator of the generalisation of the cheating ‘culture’. It is alarming 
the  fact  that  for  all  the  countries  analysed almost 90% of students admit having seen others 
committing illegal behaviours at exams – one third approximately claimed to observe that type of 
behaviour often or always! 
The  cheating  ‘culture’  seems  pervasive  in  Latin  America,  where  grossly  all  students  have 
observed others copying (45% admitted to have seen the phenomena with regularity), Eastern 
Europe (particularly Poland and Romania), and South Europe (namely Spain). Quite differently, 
the phenomenon is seldom observed in the Nordic countries – around 80% of Nordic students 
never observed other colleagues committing frauds in examinations. In the New Zealand and 
British Isles approximately half of the students stated never seen others copying. Regarding the 
observation of copying with some regularity, the percentages are quite high (approximately 70% 
or more) in countries such as the United States, Argentina, Poland, Austria and Spain.  
The pervasiveness of cheating is further confirmed by the percentage of students that recognised 
knowing someone of their closer relations that copies with regularity – in Spain, Brazil, Romania, 
Slovenia and Colombia that percentage is around or above 80%. 
Such pervasiveness is large extent explained by the opinion and attitude of students regarding 
those illegal behaviours. From our results we found that, on the overall, only 12.2% of respondent 
students reckon that cheating is a serious problem and around one third recognize that it deserves 
some concern. For the majority (60%), cheating is not a problem or is a trivial problem.  
As expected, in the Nordic countries, this phenomenon is considered ‘not an issue’ – more than 
80% of the Nordic students considered copying in examinations not a problem or a minor one. 
Interesting are the results gathered from Nigeria, Mozambique and Argentina. In these countries 
copying in exams is considered, by a substantial part of the undergraduates (over 70%), a serious 
problem or a problem that deserves some attention. Albeit the considerable amount of fraudulent 
behaviour among undergraduates in these nations, their pupils seem to have conscience of the 
relevance of the phenomenon. Eastern countries, despite having even more preoccupying rates of 
copying than the latter mentioned countries, do not seem to recognise it as an important issue 
which  deserves  some  concerns  and  actions  For  instance,  in  Slovenia  and  Poland  where  the   20
magnitude of cheating is paramount, a large majority of student do not perceive cheating as a 



















































































Figure 3: Students’ opinion regarding copying by block/country 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
Troublesome is the fact that not only students reckon copying as a minor problem but a large 
percentage (around 40% of all respondents) argues that copying is an intentional act. Only 17% 
admit that copying occurred due to panic.  
The countries where a higher percentage of students identifies copying with panic situations are 
in general those where fraud in academia is less expressive – Sweden, Denmark, British Isles and 
New Zealand.  
Meaningful  and  asking  for  reflection  is  the  evidence  that  more  prone  to  illegal  behaviour 
countries – Romania, Slovenia, Brazil, Spain, France – tend to a larger extent regard copying as 
an  intentional  act.  Likewise,  in  Portugal  and  the  US  a  significant  proportion  of  students 
recognises that copying is intentional. 
   21
Figure 4: Type of copying by block/country 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
Another worrying finding is that more than half of the students asserted that they would study 
less if there were no supervision/vigilance at the exams and/or no sanction existed for illegal 
practices  in  examinations.  In  Poland,  a  country  where,  according  to  our  data,  cheating  is 
widespread, that figure reaches three-quarters of the students. In other Eastern countries, such as 
Slovenia and Romania, the percentages are also frightening (68.9% and 56.1%, respectively). In 
three South Europe countries – Turkey (66%), Spain (65.8%), and Italy (57.5%) –, as well as in 
France (56.5%) the figures are also quite alarming. In these countries, as it is possible to observe 
in Figure 5, the environments are quite permissive to illegal behaviours – the highest penalty 
students  expects  form  deceitful  acts  is  that  their  exam  would  be  nil.  In  countries  where  the 
incidence of academic fraud is lower – the Nordic and New Zealand – students expect more 
serious consequences for illegal behaviour which may lead to one year of suspension from the 





































































































































































































Nil and one year suspension Nil and prevented for doing exam in that year Warning, reduced grade or nil
 
Figure 5: Expected sanction for copying by block/country 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
In Spain a huge percentage (64%) of students that admitted having, at some time, copied have 
been caught by professors and/or supervisors/vigilantes. That figure is also high for Argentina. 
However, in general, the percentage of students that admit copying that happened to be caught 
committing illegal practices is rather low (less than 20% for the overall sample).  
Nevertheless, a reasonable percentage (around 60%) of the (total) students have, at some time, 
seen other colleagues being caught committing fraud. That percentage is astonishingly high for 
Eastern European countries, Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria and Italy.  
This however did not prevent the widespread of the illegal practices in these countries, which 
further  sustains  the  inconsequentiality  of  the  sanctions  expected  by  students  when  caught  in 
fraudulent behaviours.   23
A particularly efficient system is that of Denmark where one quarter of the (smallest number of) 
students  that  admits  copying  is  caught.  In  Sweden  although  no  student  admitted  ever  being 
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Figure 6: Efficiency of the vigilance system by block/country 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
In terms of the characteristics of the students surveyed, the data gathered point for a slightly 
higher  probability  of  copying  among  female  students  (62.4%  versus  61.4%).  However,  the 
picture  is  quite  blurred  when  we  analyse  by  (blocks)  of  countries. In Latin America, Nordic 
countries, Eastern Europe and Africa, females do cheat more than their males counterparts. By 
contrast, in the US plus British Isles, Western Europe, South Europe, and New Zealand males 
students present a higher propensity to fraud. 
As can be seen in the next figure, students with intermediary ages, i.e. aged 20 to 25 (representing 
about 78.4% of the total students surveyed) registered a probability to cheat ranging between 
61.7% and 67.2%, much higher than the 55.6% registered among younger students (17 – 19 
years) and 55.9% among older students (26 and over).    24
Again, there is some diversity among (blocks of) countries, with Latin America, Nordic, South 
Europe,  Africa  and  New  Zealand  following  a  similar  path  than  the  overall  sample  –  higher 
probability of copying by intermediate aged students. In the US and British Isles and in Eastern 
Europe countries older students are more likely to commit illegal behaviours than their younger 
colleagues. Differently, in Western Europe younger students (those aged 17-18 years old) have 
substantially higher copying propensity than their older colleagues (75.0% against 57.6%). 
Figure 7: Copying propensity by age and (blocks of) countries 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 




































































































































Copying propensity  25
Although at a first glance age tend to be related to schooling year in which the student is enrolled, 
the  results  show  a  strong  relationship  between  the  propensity  to  copy  and  coming  closer  to 
concluding the degree. Students enrolled in the final year (4
th year) reveal a 70.8% probability to 
copy whereas their colleagues in the 2
nd year registered 57.8%. Such result is also robust for 
(blocks of) countries as patent in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Copying propensity by schooling year and (blocks of) countries 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
Most  of  the  students  surveyed  (86.3%) are ‘Regular/Normal Students’. Association Members 
(AMs) and Working Students (WSs) count for, respectively, 3.4% and 8.8% of all the students 
surveyed.
3  The  latter  two  groups  admitted  to  a  greater  propensity  to  practice  dishonest  acts 
academically,  namely  62.7%  (AMs)  and  66.6%  (WSs),  against  the  61.5%  of  the  so-called 
‘regular’ students, which may possibly reveal that AMs and WSs have less time to dedicate to 
study. 
                                                 
3  There  is  another  category,  ‘Others’,  which  includes  loosely  speaking  students  from  the  Portuguese-speaking 










































The data in this exploratory analysis seem to confirm, albeit not as strongly as in the case of the 
study focusing only Portugal (Rocha and Teixeira, 2005b), the inverse relation between student’s 
performance (proxied by the average academic grade or Grade Point Average – G.P.A.) and the 
respective propensity to cheat. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 9, the students with a better 
academic  performance  (average  grade  of  80%  or  higher  on  a  scale  from  0  –  100)  admit  on 
average to a propensity to copy of 57.8%, a number which is below the one of their less brilliant 
colleagues (average grades between 50% and 60%), who reveal a propensity to cheat of 63.6%. 
Figure 9: Copying propensity by grade point average and (blocks of) countries 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006. 
In cross-country terms, the inverse relation between student’s performance and the corresponding 
(average) propensity to cheat is also verified in the case of Latin America, Western Europe, South 
Europe and New Zealand (Oceania). In Eastern Europe and African countries those students with 
intermediate  average  grades  tend  to  copy  more  than  their  lower  and  higher  performance 
colleagues. Oddly are the US and British Isles and the Nordic countries where top grade students 
(GPAs between 80% and 100%) admit to undertake fraudulent acts in higher proportion than low 
grade students (GPAs between 50% and 60%) - respectively 26.8% versus 15.2% in the case of 










































































































































































































































Table 6: Descriptive statistics 
    Mean  s  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
  Probability of copying  0,65  0,476  0  1  0,147
***  0,131
***  -0,003  0,412
***  0,294





*  0,016  0,103
*** 









***  -0,019  -0,018  Expected 








***  0,022  -0,019  -0,012 
Opportunity 
cost 
(3) Grade  63,88  0,159  50  100        0,065
***  0,019  0,021  0,074
***  -0,035




(4) Frequency that observes 
the act of copying (1: 
never …5: always) 







***  0,002  0,129
*** 
(5) Familiarity with someone 
that copies regularly 











permeability  (6) Opinion regarding 
copying (1: not a problem 
… 4: serious problem) 
2,19  0,409  1  4              0,068
***  -0,023
*  0,060
***  -0,005  0,024
*  -0,016  0,023
* 
(7) See other being caught 
copying 
0,58  0,494  0  1                0,116
***  -0,094
***  -0,226
***  0,012  0,043
***  0,084
*** 
(8) Supervisors’ influence in 
amount of study (0: no 
influence … 6: study less 
50% or more) 
2,08  0,709  0  6                  -0,021  -0,064
***  -0,013  -0,045
***  0,008 
(9) Expected sanction for 
copying 
2,85  0,396  1  5                    0,092
***  0,054
***  0,001  -0,018 
Sanctions 
(10) Honour Code  1,62  0,450  0  3                      -0,036
***  -0,054
***  0,020 
(11) Gender  0,55  0,498  0  1                        -0,116
***  -0,003 
(12) Age  21,64  0,120  17  89                          0,392
***  Student 
characteristics  (13) Schooling year (1: 2nd 
year … 3: 4th year) 
1,78  0,461  1  3                           
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From  the  calculation  of  Pearson’s  linear  correlation  coefficient  (Table  6),  we  find  that  the 
probability  of  copying  appears  statistically  and  positively  correlated  with the variation in the 
benefits  gained  from  successful  copying,  the  frequency  of  seeing  other  students  copying  and 
being caught copying, with the familiarity of those who copy regularly, with the influence of 
supervisors on time spent studying, and with the school year in which students are enrolled.  
Thus, the perception of a higher grade resulting from copying encourages students to practice this 
act. Cheating is thus all the more probable the greater the expected difference in grades. On the 
other  hand,  seeing  other  students  copying  regularly  seems  to  be  associated  with  a  higher 
probability for this practice to occur (which may reflect inefficiency in the penalisations applied). 
Furthermore, the lower the percentage of time spent studying due to the knowledge that there will 
be no exam supervisors, the higher the probability of copying. Finally, students who are closer to 
concluding their degrees are more inclined to copying. 
Moreover, students that are enrolled in schools that have codes of honour are, in general less 
likely to copying in examinations. In a bivariate correlation, that is, without controlling for all the 
potential  factors  affecting  copying  propensity,  females  (who  amount  to  55%  of  respondent 
students) are more inclined to perpetrate fraud in academia.  
The Grade Point Average (GPA) per se, which has a sample mean of approximately 64% (out of 
100%),  does  not  emerge  as  significantly  correlated  to  the  probability  of  copying.  The  same 
happens with the students’ opinion regarding copying and the students’ age. 
4. Evaluating the cross-country determinants of cheating propensity 
The aim here is to assess which are the main determinants of the propensity to cheat by university 
students  at  the  international  level.  The  nature  of  the  data  observed  regarding  the  dependent 
variable [Have you ever copied in an exam? (1) Yes; (0) No] dictates the choice of the estimation 
model. Conventional estimation techniques (e.g., multiple regression analysis), in the context of a 
discrete dependent variable, are not a valid option. Firstly, the assumptions needed for hypothesis 
testing in conventional regression analysis are necessarily violated – it is unreasonable to assume, 
for instance, that the distribution of errors is normal. Secondly, in multiple regression analysis 
predicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities – they are not constrained to fall in the   29
interval between 0 and 1.
4 The approach used, therefore, will be to analyse each situation in the 
general framework of probabilistic models. 
In the model of cheating likelihood, it is believed (cf. Section 3) that a set of factors, such as 
students’ expected benefits/costs of copying, contextual factors, country of origin, among other 
variables, gathered in a vector X, explain the outcome, so that 
) , ( 1 ) 0 ( Pr ) , ( ) 1 ( Pr b b X F Y ob and X F Y ob - = = = = . 
The set of parameters b reflects the impact of changes in X on the likelihood of ‘copying’. 
The empirical assessment of the propensity to copy is based on the estimation of the following 
general logistic regression: 
i
Z
Countries ract StudentCha HCode




b b b b
+ + + +














In order to have a more straightforward interpretation of the logistic coefficients, the logistic 
model can be rewritten in terms of the odds of an event occurring - the logit model comes: 
i Countries ract StudentCha HCode




b b b b
+ + + +















The logistic coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with a one-unit 
change in the independent variable. Then e raised to the power bi is the factor by which the odds 
change when the i
th independent variable increases by one unit. If bi is positive, this factor will be 
greater than 1, which means that the odds are increased; if bi is negative, the factor will be less 
than one, which means that the odds are decreased. When bi is 0, the factor equals 1, which 
leaves the odds unchanged.  
 
                                                 
4 The logistic regression model is also preferred to another conventional estimation technique, discriminant analysis. 
According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), even when assumptions required for discriminant analysis are satisfied, 
logistic regression still performs well.   30
Table 7: Determinants of academic dishonesty among university students (ML estimation) 
Model I  Model II 
   
b ˆ   Exp( b ˆ )  b ˆ   Exp( b ˆ ) 
(1) DDGainCopy  0,366
***  1,443  0,376
***  1,456  Expected Benefíts 
(2) DGainCopy   -0,002  0,998  -0,002  0,998 
Opportunity cost  (3) Grade   -1,113
***  0,329  -0,814
***  0,443 
(4) Frequency that observes the act of copying  1,499
***  4,479  1,501
***  4,485 
(5) Familiarity with someone that copies regularly  0,292
***  1,338  0,426
***  1,531 
Context - permissibility 
and permeability 
(6) Opinion regarding copying  -0,345
***  0,709  -0,374
***  0,688 
(7) See other being caught copying  0,545
***  1,725  0,535
***  1,707 
(8) Vigilantes’ influence in amount of study  0,286
***  1,331  0,280
***  1,323 
(9) Expected sanction for copying  -0,431
***  0,650  -0,412
***  0,662 
Sanctions 
(10) HCode  -0,656
***  0,519  -0,702
***  0,496 
(14) Gender (Female=1)  -0,120
*  0,887  -0,113  0,893 
(15) Age  -0,455  0,634  -0,556
*  0,573 
(16) Schooling year  0,266
***  1,305  0,374
***  1,453 
(17) Status_Association Member  0,332  1,394  0,190  1,210 
Student characteristics 
(18) Status_Working Student  -0,121  0,886  -0,075  0,928 
United State  0,057  1,058 
British Isles 
US + British Isles 
-1,508
***  0,221 
-1,178
***  0,308 
Argentina  -0,372  0,689 
Brazil  0,509
*  1,663 
Colombia 
Latin America 
0,493  1,638 
0,081  1,084 
Denmark  -20,394  0,000 
Sweden 
Nordic 
-0,879  0,415 
-1,369
*  0,254 
Austria  0,431
***  1,539 
France  1,435
***  4,201 
Germany 
Western Europe 
0,205  1,228 
0,407
***  1,502 
Poland  20,209  597978236 
Romania  1,732




***  3,556 
1,346
***  3,843 




***  0,357 
-0,480
***  0,619 
New Zealand  Oceania  -0,047  0,954  0,000  0,999 
Italy  -0,660
***  0,517 
Spain  0,596








**  0,672 
   
Constant  5,252
***  190,950  4,249










% corrected  76.5  76.5 
Nagelkerke R Square  36.3  34.3 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  8.901 (pvalue=0.351)  12.312 (pvalue=0.138) 
Significant at 
*** 1%; 
** 5% and 
* 10%.   31
We estimated two models, one (Model I) where we control for countries, being Portugal the 
default, and the other (Model II) where we control for blocks of countries – with the default here 
being the South European block (composed by Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey). According to 
standard measures of goodness of fit both models present a reasonable quality of adjustment. In 
concrete, and referring to the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s (1989) test, which null hypothesis refers 
that the predicted values by the model are not significantly different from the observed values, 
given  that  the  p-value  is  not  significant  for  standard  values,  this  hypothesis  is  not  rejected, 
leading us to the conclusion that both models foresee the reality reasonably well. Moreover, the 
estimated model correctly predicts around three quarters of the observed values of the dependent 
variable. 
Controlling either by the country or the block of countries of origin of the students’ universities 
does  not  change  significantly  the  magnitude,  the  significance  or  the  signs  of  the  several 
coefficient estimates. Excluding gender and age coefficients for all the remaining variables in 
both models, the sign and significance of the coefficients are similar. So the models specification 
and the corresponding estimates are robust. 
The  expected  gain  in  terms  of  a  higher  grade  when  copying  is  successful  is  statistically 
significant  and  the  correspondent  coefficient  has  the  expected  (positive)  sign,  corroborating 
therefore our Hypothesis 1. According to our results, the odds ratio
5 changes by about 1.4 when 
the difference between the mark students expect if they copy is positive when compared with the 
mark they expect if they do not copying. However, nothing can be concluded concerning the 
absolute value of the difference between expected marks (between copying and not copying) and 
the odds of copying. In this line, Hypothesis 2 – “The probability of copying is higher the greater 
the difference between the mark students say they expect if they copy and the mark if no copying 
takes place” – cannot be corroborated by our data. The student’s academic performance, assessed 
by  his/her  grade  negatively  and  significantly  influences  the  propensity  to  commit  fraud  – 
everything remaining constant, the higher the student’s grade (i.e., the higher the opportunity 
cost) the lower, on average, the probability of copying.  
Copying-favourable environments – proxied by the frequency with which students observe the 
act of copying, the familiarity with someone that copies regularly and students’ opinion regarding 
                                                 
5 Ratio of the probability of copying to the probability of not copying.   32
copying  –  are  associated  with  a  higher  propensity  to  commit  this  illegal  phenomenon.  The 
negative and significant sign of the coefficient associated to the last variable indicates that the 
more serious copying is, the lower the propensity of students to commit that act. Summing up, 
our Hypothesis 3 – “In copying-favourable environments where permissibility and permeability 
towards copying is high, students’ propensity to copy tends to be higher” - is corroborated. 
Our  results  also  show  that  those  students  who  admit  to  studying  less  when  there  are  no 
supervisors and/or sanctions in case being caught cheating, have a higher propensity to copy in 
exams.  Additionally,  the  negative  sign  related  to  estimate  of  the  severity  of  the  sanctions 
confirms  Hypothesis  4,  since  the  higher  and  more  serious  the  penalisations  as  perceived  by 
students,  fewer  are  the  incentives  they  have  to  perpetrate dishonest behaviours. Even though 
having seen other students being caught copying has a positive influence on the probability of 
copying, this outcome combined with the previous results, leads to the conclusion that existing 
sanctions have no efficient effects.  
Quite significantly, the existence of ‘codes of honour’ or any written form which sets forth the 
conduct and sanction applied in a situation where copying is detected reflects a lower propensity 
to copy, corroborating therefore Hypothesis 5 – “In universities where ‘codes of honour’ exist, 
the propensity to copy among students is lower”.  
The school year in which students are enrolled arises here as the most (statistically) important 
student characteristic determining cheating behaviour. Results reveal that the closer a student is 
to concluding his/her degree, the higher the odds of copying. Gender is (statistically) relevant 
when we control for the country of the students’ schools (Model I) – here the negative sign of the 
coefficient  estimate  means  that,  ceteris  paribus,  female  students  are  less  prone  to  commit 
fraudulent acts – whereas age emerges as a negative relevant determinant when we control for the 
blocks of countries reflecting the fact that, on average, all other factors remaining constant, senior 
students are less likely to perpetrate illegal acts than their younger counterparts.  
Recall, similarly to our previous works (Rocha and Teixeira, 2005b; Teixeira and Rocha, 2006), 
when controlling for a set of determinants of cheating behaviour, student status fails to be a 
statistically relevant variable – all else being constant, having AM or WS status when compared 
to the ‘regular’ student status does not seems to result in a different attitude towards cheating.   33
There  is  a  significant  heterogeneity  in  copying  propensity  at  cross-country  level.  Students 
enrolled in schools located in countries such as the Ireland and the UK (British Isles), Nigeria, 
Italy, and Turkey present a significantly lower propensity to academic fraud than students from 
Portuguese  universities.  In  contrast  those  enrolled  in  schools  from  Brazil,  Austria,  France, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Spain reveal substantially higher (1.5-5.6) odds of copying than those 
from Portugal (the default country).  
The odds of copying are seventy-five per cent (seventy per cent) [forty per cent] lower in students 
enrolled  in  schools  located  in  Nordic  countries  (the  US  plus  British  Isles)  [Africa]  when 
compared  with  their  South  Europe  counterparts.  Distinctly,  students  enrolled  in  Western  and 
Eastern  Europe  schools  observe  statistically  significant  higher  odds  (1.5-3.8,  respectively)  of 
copying than their homologous counterparts from the South European schools. From this we can 
conclude that “The propensity to copy is influenced by the countries’ cultural and educational 
systems and socially-related factors”, that is, the data seems to enforce Hypothesis 6.  
Albeit in a very preliminary and exploratory attempt, in the following section we conclude the 
work  relating  the  different  countries’  copying  propensities  to  their  rankings  according  to  the 
Corruption Perception Index published by the International Transparency. This might potentially 
uncover a direct relation between cheating in academia with cheating in the ‘real world’. 
5. Uncovering the relation between academic cheating and ‘real world’ business corruption. 
Some final remarks 
It has been well documented that a sizeable proportion of business school students routinely 
engage in cheating during their university experience (Crown and Spiller, 1998; see also Section 
2  of  the  present  paper).  Research  mainly  focused  on  the  US  reality  indicates  that  students 
intending to enter business fields are more likely than any other group of students to engage in 
cheating and other forms of academic dishonesty (McCabe and Trevino, 1995). A study from 
Smyth and Davis (2004) exposed that business students were in fact generally more unethical in 
their behavior than non-business majors. Premeaux (2005) further points that cheating appears to 
be fairly ingrained in the culture of learning in business. According to this author such situation is 
“…  quite  unfortunate  because  today’s  business  school  students  are  tomorrow’s  business 
managers, not only in America but throughout the world.” (Premeaux, 2005: 416-7).   34
Indeed, if the same ethical standards prevail in the academic and business environments, and 
given that past behavior is a strong predictor of future behavior, it is likely that those who engage 
in unethical activities in the classroom will also engage in unethical activities in the business 
world (Grimes, 2004). 
The  data  we  gathered  from  cross-country  (average)  copying/cheating  propensity  might  be 
illuminating at this regard. In fact, if the above prediction is correct one would expect that our 
(average)  cheating  propensity  be  (significantly)  correlated  with  the  standards  measures  of 
countries’ corruption, such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by the International 
Transparency (TI, 2005), which reflects the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people and country analysts. The next two figures depict the relation between the CPI 
2005 score and two alternative measures of illegal behaviour in academia – student’s ‘Cheating 
Propensity’ and the ‘Probability of seeing other students cheating’.  
   
Figure 10: Relation between cheating in academia and ‘real world’ business corruption 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct survey conducted in the periods February 2005-May 2006; CPI (TI, 2005). 
Note: The TI Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite survey, reflecting the perceptions of business people and country analysts, both resident 
and non-resident. It draws on 16 different polls from 10 independent institutions. For a country to be included, it must feature in at least 3 polls 
(for details see www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpiIn).  
According to the data, at cross-country level, there is a non-linear significant relation between 
economics and business undergraduate cheating and countries’ CPI scores –countries that have 
both  a  very  low (‘high perceived corruption’) and very high (‘highly transparent’) CPI score 
present relatively low levels of cheating in academia. In concrete, Nigeria and Argentina, which 
according to CPI are economies where corruption is rampant, and the Nordic countries, which are 
considered “the least corrupted states in the world” (Scandinavica.com, 2006), are associated   35
with low levels of fraud incidence at university, especially Sweden (4.5%) and Denmark (5.1%) – 
see Box below.  
The British Isles and New Zealand are also well ranked economies in the CPI where student 
revealed low propensity for committing and observing others committing less ethic behaviours.  
Box: The Nordic philosophy for a corruption-free society 
» A culture of ethicality 
Corruption and falseness are strictly not tolerated in the Nordic society. Individual cases of corruption 
are very rare. Rules are clear, taken seriously, and the price of being excluded from the normal circles 
of society is exceptionally high. (…) 
» Low hierarchical structure 
Civil servants are responsible for doing their work without the intervention of superiors and have to 
inform  others  about  their  actions  and  duties.  An  administration  with  a  low  hierarchical  structure, 
transparency, and a high degree of individual and collective responsibility does not foster corruption. 
» Scandinavian Welfare: an egalitarian society 
A well-educated society is one of the pillars of the Nordic Welfare system. The Nordic countries believe 
in a democratic and egalitarian society where the ideal is to achieve the welfare of all the country citizens. 
The civil servant reflects these values, a democratic mentality and high standard of education being 
dominant in the civil service.  
Source: Scandinavica.com Magazine (May, 2006) 
If one excluded Nigeria and Argentina, the relation between academic fraud and ‘real world’ 
transparency would be (in statistic terms) significantly negative (Pearson correlation coefficient 
estimate around –0.71), conveying the idea that countries where the cheating propensity is high 
the CPI scores are low, that is, corruption levels are high. 
These two countries are notwithstanding interesting cases studies. Here there is a widespread 
feeling of the need to combat fraud and corruption. “Nigerians have identified corruption as the 
nation’s number one problem and Nigerians are demanding that something is done about it” 
(IAP,  2006).  In  fact,  a  recent  survey  in  Nigeria  reveals  that  58  per  cent  of  respondents  say 
corruption is the nation’s major problem while 42 per cent say it is a major problem (IAP, 2006). 
Highlighting  its  anti  corruption  programmes  for  a  nearby  future,  the  NGO Advocacy Project 
underline that the 2006 survey on Nigeria’s corruption rather than being a mere perception of the   36
degree  of  corruption,  it  would  seek  to  provide  benchmarks  of  integrity  based  on  actual 
incidences.  
Likewise, in Argentina several attempts have been made in recent years to curb corruption both at 
the society as a whole and in the education sector in particular. Arcidiacano (2005) describes how 
Poder Ciudadano (Transparency International’s chapter in Argentina), helped the Ministry of 
Education to increase transparency in the pre-contract phase of a large textbook procurement. 
Though not all instruments were applied to their full potential, stakeholders felt that there was 
greater  impartiality  in  the  selection  process,  and  that  trust  had  been  restored.  In  an  depth 
reflection of Argentina’s corruption Hernandez (2004) emphasizes that “… the attempt to clean 
up corruption in this country, people are going to have to change the way they do politics, the 
way they do business, the way they run their lives. Not so much because of law or regulation but 
because of the recognized need to improve their standard of living”. She further recognizes that 
with the help of NGOs like Poder Ciudadano, gradually Argentina is changing. Our data on 
undergraduate student cheating evidence that at least at this level people are becoming more 
conscious  on  the  seriousness  of  the  issue  –  recall  that  a  substantial  percentage  of  the 
undergraduates  (over  70%)  in  Argentina  and  Nigeria  consider  copying  in  exams  a  serious 
problem that deserves attention. 
Lawson (2004) found a strong relationship between students’ propensity to cheat in an academic 
setting and their attitude toward unethical behavior in the business world. He argued that the long 
held belief of students that unethical behavior is the norm in the business world is a cause for 
concern. Some authors further argue that where there is the general belief that ‘‘corruption is 
okay” or a normal practice’ one will find corruption (e.g., Caiden et al., 2001; Uprety, 2000). 
There is widespread agreement that corruption has become one of today’s most pressing global 
and ethical problems (Ryan, 2000; Sanyal and Samanta, 2000; Pacini et al., 2002; Weber and 
Getz, 2004). Corruption is said to distort standards of merit and erode the respect of law (Hamir, 
1999), result in higher public investment and lower quality of infrastructure (Schloss, 1998; Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1998), and hold back political and economic advance (Klitgaard, 1994).  
An  understanding  of  the  extent  of  cheating  in  our  educational  institutions,  namely  at  the 
university level, and an awareness of what procedures might therefore be taken to prevent its 
occurrence,  is  important for teachers and administrators of schools and, indeed, to the wider 
educational community and society. This has more than just a moral, watchdog sense for, by   37
implication, understanding cheating and being able to scrutinise for such activity will ultimately 
assist in making educational assessment fairer and more equitable (Godfrey and Waugh, 1997). 
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - . ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ 3 ￿ & ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿$ 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -1 ￿ ￿ & , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4￿ . ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &@ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿
’ ( & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A % ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> & ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿
￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿+ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> & ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ -. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ -1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ , ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
- . ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - 3 " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿
> & ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* $ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿ &￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿, ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # # ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> & ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* * ￿
￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
. ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿? ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
4" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ % % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿. ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3 " ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* 2 ￿
. ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ -. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿C￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿
￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿￿
7 ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ " % % ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- " ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ # ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ & , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ # ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ * " > > ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ $ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ D ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ * ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ F ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ G ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
H " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / - ￿ 7 : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ 2 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # # ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 I ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ , 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( " ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿
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